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Societies have confronted problems of environmental
degradation since at least the Egyptian period. Many of these
problems have been specific to particular societies, and thus
remedial actions, in the form of laws, have varied widely in degree
and target. Nonetheless, they reveal a consistent concern among
law makers regarding the rates of natural resource consumption
and environmental degradation. The earliest recorded official
prohibitions like that by Ikhnathon, King of Egypt, more than three
thousand years ago involved the implementation of crudely worded
statements of penalties to be imposed in the event that a
marshland was destroyed or that trees in a certain area were cut
down by unauthorized individuals. Others were established on
independent initiative, by the Assyrian Kings, beginning with
Tiglathpileser I, in the eleventh century B.C.; the Greeks from the
period of Xenophon (ca. 360 B.C.) onward; the Indian rulers
beginning with Ashoka; the Chinese form the reign of Hsiaohsuan
(ca. 100 B.C.); the Romans from A.D. 23; the Mongol Kubla! Khan; the
Aztec Montezuma; the Inca Pachacuti and many more.
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With increasing technological advancement came ever more
elaborate prohibitions, both in wording and effect, but in the last
1 Robert M. Alison, The Earliest Traces of a Conservation Conscience,
ENVIRONMENT Jan.-Feb. 1989.
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few generations mankind's ability to deal with the problem of
environmental degradation has itself been transformed. Our
understanding of the environment has not kept pace with our
capacity to alter it, and our ability to control our impact has fallen
far behind. The visible and imminent impacts of our newly
acquired powers have forced us to recognize that the environment
consists of scarce and exhaustible resources. Therein lies the
current threat.
The United States and other nations around the world
currently are facing increasingly difficult and perilous
environmental challenges that embrace global climate change,
indoor pollution, stratospheric ozone depletion, acid rain, urban
smog, infectious wastes on the shorelines, invisible contamination
of underground water supplies, and the degradation of public lands.
Together, they threaten to destablize the very planet we live on.
Thus, we must arrest the wasteful and destructive practices that
have launched and enlarged these environmental challenges.
Legislatures, agencies and the courts must establish environmental
goals and implement reforms.
Admittedly, there was significant federal and state
environmental legislation in the late 60's and the early 70's, but
now the environmental challenges are more serious, more
persuasive and more varied in nature and impact. The rising
dangers to our environment and our heightened awareness of these
threats call for new thinking, new inquiry, and above all new
approaches.
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The most promising approach is to harness market forces to
spur technological advance and sustainable management of natural
resources. This thesis explores how economics can stimulate
rational solutions to environmental problems. It specifically
addresses strategies that have been implemented to increase
environmental protection and economic productivity by providing
incentives for businesses and individuals to go beyond what
regulators requIre.
II. CHANGING POLITICAL LANDSCAPE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
Over the past two decades many theories of regulatory
reform have been advocated which would give our environmental
law a "new legal direction". But regulatory reform is easier said
than done. The controversy begins when one moves as Winston
Churchill said, "From the wonderful c10udland of aspiration to the
ugly scaffolding of attempt and achievement. "2 Despite intense
interest, few proposals survive the perilous path from concept to
implementation. Market-based pollution control policy is a notable
exception even though it alters the way regulators approach
pollution control. Its origins can be traced far back to Dales3, and
the subsequent writings of Montgomery4, DeLucia5, Tietenberg6,
Bruce Ackerman 7 and Stephen Breyer8•
2 Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science and Democracy, ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 19, 24 (1985).
3 Dales 1., Pollution, Property and Principle, UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO PRESS
(1968).
4 Montgomery David, Market Licences and Efficient Market Control
Programs, J. ECON. THEORY, 395 (1972).
5 De Lucia Russel, Evaluation of Effluent Permit Systems, OFF. RES. DEV. U.S.
WASH. (1973).
6 Tietenberg T. H., Property Rights for Air Pollution Control, 22 PUB. POL'Y. 29
(1974).
7 Rose & Bruce Ackerman, Market Models for Air Pollution Control: Strengths
and Weaknesses, 25 PUB. POL'Y 283 (1978).




As the decade of the 1990's begins, political leaders are
increasingly embracing market-based regulatory strategies to
achieve sustained environmental progress. Liberals view market
approaches as acceptable because' they are neutral among
preferences and are thus egalitarian. Conservatives assert that
markets are good because they reward traditional virtues such as
thrift and hard work while punishing all vices. Nearly everyone
agrees that markets are advantageous insofar as they are
impersonal and relieve the government of responsibility for the
consequences of choices individuals make.9
The current policy debate looks very different from the time
when economic incentives were characterized as a "licence to
pollute" or dismissed as completely impracticable.10 President
Johnson's proposal for effluent fees11 and President Nixon's
recommendations for a tax on lead in gasoline and a sulphur
dioxide emission fee were dismissed with little consideration. 12
Now, however, economic incentive policies for enhancing
environmental quality have moved to center stage in Washington
and a number of state capitals.13
In the 1980's, Congress was jolted into action by several
highly publicized environmental disasters and began debate on
9 See generally SCHULTZE, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977).
10 See AIm, The Post Regulatory Environmental Protection Regime, 23 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 1338 (1989).
11 Id.
12Id.
13 See Hahn, Robert W. & Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental
Regulation: A New Era From An Old Idea? 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. (1991).
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fundamental restructuring of environmental law.14 Although
political stalemates prevented any legislation on this front during
the tenure of President Reagan15 incentive based strategies were
being deployed by 1988 to address specific problems. On June 12,
1989, President Bush proposed amendments to the Clean Air Act.
The act's central feature was to introduce a market-oriented
approach for controlling acid rain, which involves a free trading of
sulphur dioxide "allowances" and is expected to provide flexibility,
efficiency, conservation and innovation in solving pollution
problems.16 This proposal was sent to Congress on July 2, 1989, In
the form of a bill introduced by Congressman John Dingall17 and a
companion piece was introduced in the Senate by Senator John
Chafee.18 In early April 1990, the Senate passed its version of the
Clean Air Bill, with a tradable system patterned after the one
proposed in the administration bill.19 The House of Representatives
did likewise in May20 and in November, President Bush signed the
compromise between the House and the Senate Bills, calling for a
market-based approach to reduce sulphur dioxide emissions by 10
14 See United States v. Shell Oil Co. 605, F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985).
15 Although the Reagan administration had embraced a market oriented
ideology, it demonstrated little interest in applying actual market-oriented
policies in the environmental area. To its credit, the Reagan administration
had endorsed a market-based approach for removing lead from gasoline, but
it targeted its energies mostly at the development and enhancement of the
regulatory approach. See ENVIRONMENTALPOLICY UNDER REAGAN'S EXECUTIVE
ORDER:THE ROLE OF BENEFITCOSTANALYSIS.(V. SMITHed. 1984).
16 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), 135 CONGoREC. H4440-52, § 218
(Mobile Emission Sources), § 401 (Permits), § 501 (Acid Rain).
17 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
18 S. 1490. 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
19 S. 1630, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
20 H.R. 3030, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1990).
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million tons.21 Now Congress is considering bills that would apply
economic incentive mechanisms to problems as diverse as water
pollution and hazardous waste management.22
Several factors stimulated ihis renewed interest III economic
incentives and their incorporation in legislation such as Title IV of
the Clean Air Act. The cost of environmental compliance has
reached about 90 billion dollars per annum, an increase of about 40
percent since 1984.23 It is increasingly unlikely that we can
improve environmental protection simply by spending more money
on programs and policies already in place.
Political realignment is another reason for the change III this
attitude. The Bush regime perceives an opportunity to
accommodate many moderate voters by taking an aggressive,
though cost-effective, stand on environmental concerns.24 In a poll
conducted in July 1991, 76 percent of the people interviewed
favoured economic incentives to encourage the development and
use of less polluting technology by U.S. businesses while only 9
percent opposed them.25
The new environmental concerns at both the global and
national levels, and the growing recognition of their worth is
21 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
22 More than 100 bills characterized by EPA as using economic incentives
were introduced in the 101st Congress. See U.S. EPA, ECONOMIC INCENTIVES IN
PENDING ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION, Office of Policy Planning & Evaluation,
Washington D.C., July 1990.
23 See Farber & Rulledge, Pollution Abatement and Control Expenditures, 66
SURV.CURRENTBUS. 94, 97 (1986).
24 See The Politics and Religion of Clean Air Regulations, WINTER 1990, at 22.
25 Poll: Environment USA 91, American Political Network, Inc. Greenwire
July 9, 1991.
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prompting a dramatic change in the political landscape of
environmental policy. Within the last two years lawmakers,
environmentalists, bureaucrats, business persons and citizens have
recognized that market based apprmlches belong to our portfolio of
environmental and natural resource policies.
III. THEORY OF MARKET-BASED ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICIES
Market-based environment policies seek to achieve
environmental protection on a low cost basis while providing
adequate incentives for improved performance. Polluters who have
complied with existing controls should have incentives to further
reduce pollution. Market forces can stimulate rational solutions to
environmental problems, but the sources of regulatory failure must
be first identified.
A. CONVENTIONAL COMMAND-AND-CONTROL
REGULATORY MECHANISMS: STRUCTURE AND
FAILINGS
Traditionally the U.S. philosophy of environmental law has
been "command-and-control" .26 Statutes, regulations, and policies
have "commanded" polluters to achieve the appropriate levels of
pollution "control". Two policy mechanisms have been commonly
used to control environmental pollution: technology-based
standards and performance standards. Technology-based standards
try to identify the particular equipment that must be used to
26 See, e.g., Davis, Approaches to the Regulation of Hazardous Waste, 18
ENVTL. L. 505 (1988); Stewart, Regulation, Innovation and Administrative
Law: A Conceptual Framework, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1256 (1981).
9
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comply with a regulation and performance standards try to achieve
a specific goal.
Although uniform technology-based and performance
standards may be effective in achieving some established goals and
standards, they often do so at a very high cost to the society,
imposing billions of dollars in compliance costs and causing a
decrease in productivity, technological innovation and market
competition.27 According to a report by EPA, the total expenditures
by individuals, private businesses and various levels of
government for compliance with federal environmental regulations
now amount to about $155 billion annually.28 By the year 2000,
according to the EPA, annual compliance expenditures will have
grown to $171 billion, in 1990 dollars.29 To provide some
perspective on these numbers, the $155 billion EPA spent in 1990
is almost 40 percent of all defense spending and is about equal to
the amount the U.S. spent for medicare and medicaid assistance
combined. The $155 billion was 2.1 percent of the Gross National
Product (GNP) and is expected to rise to 2.6 percent by the year
2000.30
These regulatory mechanisms fail to provide incentives to
improve anti-pollution devices. Where the polluter has complied
with existing controls, he has no incentive for improved
27 For some estimates of costs resulting from this approach, see Hahn &
Hester, Marketable Permits: Lessons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q.
361, 368-76 (1989).
28 See generally U.S. EPA, ENVIRONMENTAL INVESTMENTS: THE COST OF A CLEAN
ENVIRONMENT at v-vii (1990).
29 [d.
30 Paul R. Portney, Katherine N. Probst & Adam M. Finkel. The EPA at "Thirty
Something", 21 ENVTL. L. 1461 (1991).
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performance. The present permit system tells the polluter how
much of the regulated pollutants he can discharge. It has the big
drawback of being non-transferable because a polluter is obliged to
cut back his own wastes even if it is' cheaper for him to pay his
neighbor to do the extra cleanup instead.31 The inevitable
drawbacks are increasingly apparent: excessive bureaucratic
centralization, rigidity, cost, litigation and delay.
The command-and-control approaches usually take the form
of regulatory requirements of the "Best Available Technology"
(BAT). If an industry generates any pollution, it must install
whatever technology is available to reduce or eliminate the
pollution, so long as the cost of doing so does not cause a shutdown
of the plant or industry. BAT requirements used in many fields of
environmental regulation, including air and water pollution, waste
millions of dollars every year by ignoring variations among plants
and industries in the cost of reducing pollution and by ignoring
geographical variations in pollution effects.32 To cope with the
demands in regulating several hundred thousand industrial sources
of pollution and over a million hazardous waste generators, federal
regulators rely on "wholesale" standards and ignore the local
environmental variables. In view of these variables, nationally
uniform requirements are widely inefficient. It does not seem
sensible to impose identical technological requirements on diverse
industries, regardless of whether they pollute or are clean, or
31 See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Marketable Pollution
Control, LAND USE & ENVTL. L. REV. 401 (1987).
32 Latin, Ideal Versus Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform
Standards & "Fine Tuning", 37 STAN. L. REV. 69 (1985).
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expensive or cheap to cleanup. If controls were tailored to
individual plants, our current expenditure for air and water
pollution could be reduced from over $50 billion annually to $25
billion or less with no sacrifice of overall environmental quality. 33
Such tailoring, however, is an administrative impossibility in a
centralized system of regulation.
The problems go deeper still. BAT requirements usually apply
only to new entrants to the market. By requiring all new industry
to adopt costly technology while allowing existing plants and
industries to conform to more lenient standards, BAT strategies
penalize new products. Further, regulatory screening is biased
against new plants and products, which must undergo a costly, time
consuming, and uncertain process of regulatory clearance before
they can be built or placed on the market.34 They do not provide
strong incentives for the development of new environmentally
superior strategies and may in fact discourage their development.
Such innovations are important for maintaining long-term economic
growth, without simultaneously increasing pollution.35 A large goal
of regulation should by to promote technological innovation in
pollution control. Regulation should increase rather than decrease
incentives.
A large part of the defect, a regulatory paradox, lies in the
stringency of the BAT approach.36 Strict regulation, applied
33 See Richard B. Stewart, controlling Environmental Risks Through
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 157 (1988).
341d.
35 See J. KRIER & EURSIN, POLLUTION AND POLICY, 24-27 (1977).
36 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Substance, DUKE L.J. 607, 629 (1991).
13
universally without regard to the diversity of the regulated class,
will bring about overregulation forcing people to incur
exceptionally high costs for speculative gains.37 The paradox IS that
stringent controls even produce underregulation. Threat of
stringent regulatory standards give industry powerful incentives to
fight regulation wherever they can and regulators a powerful
incentive for inaction. The agencies thus promulgate stringent but
fewer regulations. This tendency is reflected by the fact that the
government has regulated only seven toxic air pollutants out of
hundreds,38 fewer than a dozen water toxic pollutants, again out of
hundreds,39 and only ten toxic substances in the workplace,
although the recommended level of exposure limits to hundreds of
chemicals.4o
In addition BAT strategies are extremely expensive to
enforce, imposing extra-ordinary monitoring burdens on agencies
that employ them.41 This system of control imposes a massive
information gathering burden on administrators to determine the
complex scientific, engineering and economic issues regarding the
feasibility of control on hundreds and thousands of pollution
37 See 1. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF TOXIC SUBSTANCE REGULATION, 24-26
" (1988).
38 See note, Towards Sensible Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollutants under
Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 612, 613-14 (1988).
39See F. ANDERSON, E. MANDELKER & D. TARLOK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION,
439-43 (1990).
40 See J. MENDELOFF, supra note 37, at 2.
41 See, e.g., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR,REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE CONGRESS ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH FOR FISCAL YEAR 1988 xiv (1990) ($151,702,000 out of total OSHA
1988 fiscal year budget of $235,474,000 allocated to federal and state
enforcement) .
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sources. Even when the administration in Washington is committed
to strong enforcement, federal agencies cannot themselves enforce
standards against hundreds and thousands of plants. The will and
the ability of federal and state agencies is often eroded by limited
resources. Thus non-compliance is widespread. Further
environmentally inappropriate centralized uniform standards are
likely to be unworkable or arbitrary in many applications.
This provides a fertile ground for complex litigation which
may be more-cost effective for the industry than compliance.42 The
industry challenges administrative discretion as well as the factual
and analytical justifications for agency regulations through
protracted administrative hearings and judicial review proceedings
that delay the implementation of these programs.43 The firms end
up spending more money on lawyers than on cleanup. A recent
study indicates that large corporations spent about $1.3 billion on
superfund type claims between 1986 and 1989, and about $1
billion of that went to lawyers.44 According to researchers, the
lawyers' share could easily have funded cleanups of 40 polluted
sites. Even environmental groups disgruntled with the system of
regulatory control resort to the courts to challenge the laxity of the
regulators and mandate administrative implementation and
enforcement. 45 Repeated litigation by industry and environmental
42 See Stewart, supra note 26.
43 Id; See also S. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT 193 (1983).
44 M. Moses, Insurers Payouts Over Superfund Flow to Lawyers, WALL STREET
JOURNAL, April 24, 1992. p.Bl; See also Marianne Lavelle. Study Measures
Superfund Costs, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, May 4, 1992, p.3.
45 See Richard B. Stewart, supra note 33, at 157.
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groups, challenging the scientific, economic and engineering details
of regulatory decisions also burdens the courts and strains their
competence.
Further, BAT strategies are aimed at superficial symptoms
rather than focussing on the real causes of pollution. For example,
EPA until now had forced coal-fired power plants to adopt costly
"scrubbing" strategies to deal with sulphur dioxide emissions,46
while a far more useful approach would be the use of financial
incentives to encourage industry to increase energy conservation
and efficiency and to shift to cleaner renewable fuels.
A final defect in these regulatory approaches is that they are
severely deficient from the standpoint of a well-functioning
political process. The system undermines the democratic
accountability of environmental policy decisions. It requires
Congress to delegate enormous discretion to federal bureaucracies
to formulate standards regulating different environmental
problems. Choices about environmental protection goals and
priorities are buried in thousands of highly technical standard-
setting decisions made by agencies and reviewed by courts. The
decision-making process is dominated by lawyers representing
organized industry and environmental groups.47 Further, the
citizens and representatives focus attention on largely incidental
and nearly impenetrable questions about the 'available' technology
rather than the 'appropriate' technology. This focus on the 'means'
46 See B. ACKERMAN & W. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981).
47 See Richard B. Stewart, supra note 33, at 158.
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increases the power of well-organized private groups by allowing
them to use the system for their own parochial ends.
Thus, our regulatory system is self-defeating as it brings
about results that are precisely opposite to those intended; it
strangles investment and innovation; it encourages costly litigation
and delay; and it unduly limits private initiative and choice. The
centralized command-and-control system is simply unacceptable as
a long term strategy for environmental protection, for a nation
committed to the market and decentralized ordering.
B. MARKETABLE POLLUTION CONTROL: A SOLUTION TO
THE DILEMMA
Economic incentives do not dictate the conduct of each of the
hundreds and thousands of enterprises. Instead they impose a
price or economic cost on conduct that creates pollution or chemical
risk, leaving to each enterprise the decision on the exact level of
control. Under these systems, the decision as to how much and how
to control is made on an individual basis by each plant or
enterprise. A central principle is that as consumers and as
producers, each and everyone of us needs to weigh the full social
costs and consequences of our decisions before we act. This
principle applies, for example, to our decisions as consumers to use
products like lead acid batteries and to dispose of them at
municipal landfills, where the lead can contaminate ground water
or our decisions as producers to use such technology that may
inject acid rain causing sulphur dioxide into the atmosphere.
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By changing the incentives an individual faces, that individual
can use his typically superior information to select the best means
of meeting his responsibility. Regulators can persuade polluters to
respect nature by making it worthwhile for them.48 This
decentralized flexibility gives economic incentive systems several
important advantages over command-and-control regulations.
Market-based environmental policy mechanisms provide
various ways to make the consumers and producers recognize the
social costs and consequences of their decisions and thus provide
incentives for environmental protection: tradable permits for
industrial pollutants; pollution charges; deposit-refund systems for
containerized hazardous wastes; least-cost bidding for greater
efficiency; removal of barriers that promote inefficient resource
use; and removal of unwarranted subsidies for environmentally
destructive activities.
There are social costs of dumping things in the aIr, III the
ground and III the water. Instead of a central planning technique
that tells each firm what it should do and some administrators in
Washington trying to decide that technique, the idea is to use the
price signal to tell the industry, "This is the cost of pollution, but it
is up to you to find the cheapest way of minimizing that cost." Each
business has the freedom to devise the control methods that are
most appropriate, effective and the cheapest for its particular
circumstances. Polluters can comply in any way so long as the
reduction of emissions, wastes and discharges is achieved. They
48 See Tietenberg, supra note 6.
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may trade their pollution rights, or buy and sell each others
permits, thereby creating a powerful financial incentive for those
who clean up most, most cheaply.
Overall, the total cost of achieving any given level of pollution
will be reduced under this system as opposed to the more uniform
command-and-control regulation. This reform will tend to bring
about a least cost allocation of control burdens saving many billions
of dollars annually by giving firms with relatively low control costs,
an incentive to control above the level required by uniform
regulation, while allowing firms with high costs to control less. For
example, a market-based approach to acid rain reduction could
save $3 billion per year, compared to the cost of a dictated
technological solution.49 The cost savings can vary but they can run
anywhere between 20 to 30 percent to 50 percent or more.50
The history of pollution control in the U.S. suggests that
rather than simply controlling pollution, we need to prevent that
pollution by substituting less polluting technologies for those that
are more polluting.51 Incentive-based systems are the most
realistic way to move to a pollution prevention focus on our
environmental programs. They can provide inspiration to the
private sector to develop new pollution control technologies and
49 See ROGER K. RAUFER & STEPHEN L. FELDMAN, ACID RAIN AND EMISSIONS
TRADING: IMPLEMENTING A MARKET APPROACH TO POLLUTION CONTROL (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1987).
50 See Ackerman & Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law:.The Democratic
Case for Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 171, 175-77 (1988); see also
Hahn & Hester, supra note 27.
51 B. COMMONER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET (1990).
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make money by doing so.52 Investments in such technologies can
lead to an increase in profits, thus providing significant
inducements for firms to adopt new pollution control strategies and
to carry out research and development of cheaper and better
pollution abatement techniques.53 All this will simplify the issues
in controversy and facilitate a more intelligent setting. Each firm
can monitor the other's process and get some inspiration from it.54
This system eliminates disproportionate burdens that BAT
imposes on new and more productive industries.55 There would be
no penalty imposed on new plants or products. All sources of
pollution will be subject to the same incentive levels and no plant
would have to go through a time-consuming review process.
This policy carries the administrative advantage of
eliminating most of the information-processing tasks that
overwhelm the bureaucracies and the regulators. EPA would not be
required to conduct the endless proceedings to determine the BAT
in each major industry in the U.S. and then to defend its decisions
before the courts, nor would federal and state agencies be required
to spend vast amounts of time and energy in adapting to the
changing national guidelines, to the particular conditions of every
important pollution source. This is not to suggest, however, that
environmental protection can be achieved without significant
,52 See LEVIN, GETTING TIIERE: IMPLEMENTING TIIE BUBBLE POLICY IN SOCIAL
~GULATION STRATEGIES FOR REFORM 59 (E. Bardach & R. Kagan, Eds. 1982).
!,53 See S. Milliman & Prince, Firm Incentives to Promote Technological
Change in Pollution Control, 17 J. ENVTL., ECON. & MGMT. 247, 247 (1989).
54 Firms would want to monitor other firms within their industry to identify
.ose that are diluting the value of their tradable permits by failing to
6omply.
See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, supra note 31, at 402.
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government expenditures, since no program of control can be
effective without a commitment by the government to monitoring
and enforcement. Monitoring and enforcement is a key element in
both regulatory and economic incentive systems; without it there
would be cheating and environmental degradation. What the
incentive system does, is to dramatically reduce the burden on the
agencies of central planning by the government. It puts the
information-processing burden precisely where it belongs; upon
business managers and engineers who are in the best position to
figure out how to cut back on their pollution costs. If one polluter
can clean up more cheaply than the other, he should be able to sell
some pollution rights to the second polluter at a mutually
advantageous price.56
In addition, economic incentive systems can be used to
provide government with an important source of revenue. Under
current regulations polluters are using air and water resources for
free. Economic incentive systems require the polluter to pay for
this privilege. Auctions and sales of pollution permits would raise
substantial sums of money for the government on a continuing
basis. Although no studies have yet been attempted to make
estimates of revenues that can be raised under this system, existing
estimates suggest that the revenues could equal the amount
polluters spend in cost-minimizing control activities.57 Even if
returns turn out to be one-third of this amount, the government
56 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 50, at 180.
57 See T. TIETENBERG, EMISSIONS TRADING: AN EXERCISE IN REFORMING
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1985).
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would still be collecting more than $6 to $10 billion annually.58 It
seems reasonable to suppose that Congress would allow the EPA
and other agencies to retain a share of these revenues.59
An added benefit of the incentive-based approach is its
tendency to make the environmental debate more understandable
to the general public.60 Because they do not dictate a particular
technology, these approaches can focus attention directly on the
basics, on what our environmental goals should be rather than on
complex technical details concerning technological alternatives for
reaching these goals. This can enhance the democratic
accountability of environmental policy decisions.61
A market system is most appropriate for a country like the
U.S., where the basic values of the social system are the sanctity of
private property, limited government, and individual liberty, all of
which are consistent with the creation of property rights and
increased freedom of choice found in the market system.
C. OBJECTIONS AND OBSTACLES: POSSIBLE CONSTRAINTS
Economic incentives have often been criticized on the ground
that they lower basic human values by allowing the ecology and
the environment to be traded off in dollars. It is often argued that
it is immoral to establish a "license" or a "right to pollute". An
58 See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 50, at 18!.
59Id.
60Id. at 188-90.
61 Marshall J. Berger, Richard B. Stewart, E. Donald Elliot & David Hawkins,
Providing Economic Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON
REG. 463 (1991).
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excellent answer to this criticism is found in the words of W.J.
Boamol and W.E. Oats, in their book, Economics, Environmental
Policy and the Quality of Life: "Society has been giving away free
too many of its environmental resources too long. It is not
scandalous to decide that everything has its price; the real scandal
lies in setting the price at zero or at some token level that invites
us to destroy these resources. Unless we recognize the legitimate
role of price incentives for the control of pollution, we may end up
with our sense of morality intact but our environment the worse
for continued abuse. "62
Pollution is an inevitable consequence of life at work and not
a product of moral turpitude. People have to live and congregate
somewhere, dispose of waste products, and even use depletable
resources. These activities cannot be abolished, though they can be
controlled. Controlling them means finding the proper balance
between the utility of these activities to the individual and the
non-utility they impose on others. The market system assumes that
air and water have a certain assimilative capacity; they have the
capacity to hold some wastes so long as safe limits are not
exceeded. Further, it may not even be correct to call it a "right to
pollute". Assigning a price to the temporary permission to pollute
does not convert it into a right. For example, in the acid rain
legislation, there is explicit language stating that the allowances to
emit sulphur dioxide, are not legal rights, but constitute temporary
permission to release these pollutants, and that they can be further
62 BAUMOL & OATS, ECONOMICS. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND THE QUALITY OF
LIFE 245 (1979).
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reduced by the action of the government consistent with the
traditional actions of the government.6 3
Besides this anxiety about the right to pollute,
environmentalists are concerned that progress towards meeting
environmental quality objectives may be slowed and many
loopholes will be created.64 Even some industrial sources, the most
natural constituents in the light of their potential cost savings and
the flexibility of the program, fear that this flexibility involves
greater risk. By reducing emissions more than required by law,
polluters could alert control authorities to the fact that additional
control was possible, and control authorities might use this to
reverse the baseline. Moreover, state authorities see it a a
threatening departure from the customary way of doing business.
A serious objection to the use of tradable pollution permits is
that it could create "hot spots", that is, relatively high
concentrations of particular pollutants in small areas, exposing the
population to high concentrations of pollution.65 This concern,
though genuine, can be avoided by developing a regulatory
infrastructure that will allow a sophisticated response to it. For
example under the acid rain trading program, the pollution
allowances for sulphur dioxide are not the only regulatory regime
for sulphur dioxide that will apply to these individual power plants.
The plants still must protect against localized high concentrations of
63 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, § 403(f), 104
Stat. 2399 (1990).
64 See Dolnger, The Dark Side of the Bubble, ENVTL. F. July 1985, at 33.
65 See Latin, Ideal Versus Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of
Uniform Standards and "Fine Tuning", 37. STAN. L. REV. 69, 1267 (1985).
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pollution that may cause health effects or may cause other local
environmental impacts,66 because this program is an overlay on a
pre-existing program.
Another criticism of economic incentives is that there could
be hoarding of pollution permits. Fearing that the market will fail
to provide them with allowances in future some industries would
bank excess allowances for future insurance. The Clean Air Act
addresses this concern by creating a broad nationwide market to
ensure competitive behavior. The annual auction of allowances
under the Clean Air Act will also foster confidence in the market,
since the auction system guarantees future availability. This
assurance would give potential sellers greater confidence that they
will be able to buy back the allowances they contemplate selling.
Even where the market is not large, hoarding can be avoided
by the contracting parties by writing clauses in the sale provisions
that cover contingencies that would otherwise discourage them
from making long-term commitments.67 An example might be a
clause that provides for a right to retrieve some of the sold
allowances in the event the seller's margins fall behind a
predefined level. Finally, anti-competitive behavior is constrained
by the antitrust laws.
Still other critics oppose economic incentive systems
because of their supposed political consequences. Legal commands
often invoke claims to vindicate rights to a clean and healthy
environment. Such appeals generate political support for strong
66 See, T. TIETENBERG, supra note 57.
67 See Berger, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61.
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control measures. Economic incentives may make the economic
aspect of environmental cleanup more explicit and more apparent.
The critics fear that doing so may erode political support for
ambitious goals and may deprive them of this political platform.
The regulatory appeal to environmental rights is disingenuous In
concealing the fact that command strategies involve major
compromises in setting and implementing environmental goals.
These compromises, however, are generally hidden from the public
view, buried in the technical details of regulatory rules and orders.
Economic incentives may make the compromises more apparent.
There are, however, some issues of implementation that must
addressed. A key issues is the development of the implementing
regulations needed to carry out economic incentive systems. One
aspect to be considered is how to implement an incentive system
that is not so entangled with bureaucratic requirements that
fundamentally impair efficient trading. Historically, EPA's emission
trading has been criticized for burdening the trading process with
too many bureaucratic requirements and safeguards.68 The
incentive system must also be consistent with the other
.•requirements of law already in place. For example, the acid rain
provisions of the Clean Air Act have multiple goals, a major
.challenge is to make sure that all these provisions of law are
.harmonized in a way that meets the requirements of law.69 If
68 See Hahn & Hester, Where Did All the Markets Go?, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 109,
146-57 (1989).
9 See, e.g., Wisconsin Elec. Power Co. v. Reilly, 893 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1990);
erto Rican Cement Co., Inc. v. EPA, 889 F.2d 292 (1st Cir. 1989) (which
held the broad reach of the PSD modification provision, raising concerns
at a utility pollution control project undertaken to comply with the acid
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initial market systems do not live up to expectations, there is a
great danger that the market-based system could be seriously
discredited. In addition, there are many practical concerns that can
be legitimately raised about the feasibility of designing and
implementing economic incentive systems in particular settings.
Economic incentives are not a cure-all, and may not be suitable for
all types of environmental problems. The real challenge is to
identify the right policy for each specific situation. The best set of
policies may typically involve a mix of market and more
conventional regulatory processes.
rain prOVIsIOns of the new act may subject the utility to rigorous PSD pre-
construction review requirements.
IV. MAJOR CATEGORIES OF INCENTIVE APPROACHES
The preceding chapters note that inefficient natural resource
use and environmental degradation can be curtailed best if
consumers and producers alike pay for the direct as well as the
indirect costs of their actions. Economic incentive systems can
provide various ways of doing this: pollution charges, tradable
permits, deposit refund systems, reduction of market barriers, and
elimination of government subsidies. These categories are discussed
in this section.
A. POLLUTION CHARGES
Pollution charges may, to some extent, be considered as a
"price" to be paid for pollution. Charge systems impose a tax or a
fee on each unit of pollution discharged and not simply on
pollution-generating activities.70 For example, a pollution charge
may take the form of a charge per unit of sulphur dioxide, not a
charge per unit of electricity generated. Such charges ensure that a
firm will internalize the previously external pollution costs and will
be forced to perform a profit-loss calculation in order to respond
efficiently to the fee. It may be in the interest of the firm to pay
70 See A PIGDO, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 192 (4th ed. 1952) (A.G. Piguo is




the fee, completely eliminate the discharge or partially reduce the
emission.
An effective charge system minimizes the aggregate cost of
pollution control and gives firms an on-going incentive to develop
and adopt newer and better pollution control technologies. Charges
can also contribute indirectly towards better environmental quality
by raising funds necessary for environmental programs. An added
advantage of the fee system is that all firms face the same level of
incentives to control. A firm will control up to the point where the
marginal cost of control equals the fee. Thus the total costs of
pollution control are minimized, as compared with other methods of
allocating the pollution control burdens across firms.
There are, however, some difficulties with charges or taxes.
First, the government may be unable to specify a target level of
pollution that will be achieved with charges. It is not possible to
estimate how large a charge will be required to obtain a desired
level of pollution reduction. There is also uncertainty about the
amount of total reduction that will be achieved by any given level
of charge as the precise responses of the firms to the charge will be
difficult to predict. Thus charges may have to be increased over
time, in order to achieve the same level of effect, if we assume
continued growth. Charges also impose significant monitoring
burdens on the government. All this does not, however, alter the
reality that charges achieve significant emission reduction in a cost-
effective manner.
Charge systems have not been widely adopted in the U.S., but




Marketable or tradable pollution permits achieve the same
cost-minimizing allocation of the pollution control burden as a
charge, while at the same time avoiding the problem of uncertain
responses by firms.74 Unlike a charge system, a system of tradable
permits allows the government to specify an overall level of
pollution that will be tolerated. This total quantity is allocated in
the form of permits among polluters. Polluters are allowed to trade
their pollution rights or to buy and sell each other's permits,
thereby creating a powerful financial incentive for those who
71 See B. COMMENER, MAKING PEACE WITH THE PLANET 97, 98 (1990).
72 See R. CRANDALL, H. GRUENSPECHT, T. KEELER & L. LAVE, REGULATING THE
AUTOMOBILE 75, 89-91 (1986).
73 See OPSCHOOR, 1. B. & HANS B. VOS, ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development 1989).
74 See HAHN & NOLL, REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 119 (W. Magat ed.
1982).
other toxic substances through taxes.7! Strategies like "old car
taxes" and "gasoline taxes" have also been advocated to decrease
automobile emission.72 Air and water pollution charges have been
adopted in France, West Germany, Sweden, Denmark, Italy, Norway,
Finland and The Netherlands. Several other European nations
remain interested in further "green taxes". These charge systems
have, however, been designed primarily as revenue-raising devices
rather than as serious incentive-based environmental
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cleanup most cheaply to sell their permits to those whose
treatment costs are the highest.
Such a system will tend to minimize the total social cost of
achieving a given level of pollution control. As an example suppose
that A and B produce 100 tons of pollution each year. But suppose
for whatever reason, it costs A four times as much as B to eliminate
a ton of pollution. Under a strictly legalistic approach, we might
pass a law requiring that each reduce its emissions by half. But that
would mean that A will have to spend a lot more money to do what
B is doing cheaply. The perfect solution would be a tradable permit
system under which B will be able to reduce his pollution by, say,
75 tons and sell A the right to 25 tons of pollution. The result is the
same; overall pollution is reduced by half. But the bulk of the
pollution reduction would have been made by B who can do it more
cheaply. Both A and B and thus society would save money. As with
the charge system, the marginal cost of control is identical between
polluters and thus the total cost of pollution is minimized for any
given level of total pollution control.
In its ideal form, the system of tradable permits would make
two simple changes in the current law. First, it would require
polluters to pay to pollute. It would not, as current law does, allow
people to pollute for free. Second, pollution permits would be
tradable. A company that is able to reduce its pollution below the
permitted level could sell all or part of its permit to someone else.
In the unlikely event that the overall emissions target levels are
viewed as too strict, the government may choose to increase the
supply of permits, and in order to reduce allowable emissions the
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regulators could take the opposite stance and reduce the supply of
permits.
Tradable permit systems have been applied primarily in the
U.S. under the EPA's Emission Trading program (bubbles, offsets,
netting and banking),75 the nationwide phase out of lead
automotive fuel (which allowed fuel refiners to bank and trade
their lead content savings), and chloroflurocarbon (CFC) reduction.76
As already mentioned Congress has enacted a tradable permit
system for acid rain control under Title IV of the Clean Air Act
amendments 1990.77 Other potential areas of application include
local "criteria" air pollution control, water pollution control, control
of global climate change and recycling credits (some of which will
be discussed in detail further in this study).
c. DEPOSIT REFUND SYSTEMS
Under the current waste control regulations, neither the
consumers nor the producers of waste materials pay disposal costs.
Thus, neither has an incentive to reduce waste. A deposit system
makes it more expensive to dispose of substances in landfills or in
oceans, by requiring that those who handle waste pay a deposit,
refundable upon the showing of safe disposal and recycling. The
75 See EPA Emissions Trading Policy Statement: General principals for
creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814.
43,829 (1986).
76 See EPA, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel-Additives. 47 Fed. Reg. 38.078,(1982)
(proposed rule); 47 Fed. Reg. 49.322 (1982) (final rule) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §
80.20 (1988)).
77 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. Pub.L. No. 101-459, § 401. 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
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government thus encourages recycling and discourages the
accumulation of solid and hazardous wastes.
The environmental effectiveness of a deposit refund system
depends on the percentages of return. Due to their nature, deposit-
refund systems are relatively attractive. Whereas charges are seen
as "penalties on bad behavior", deposit refunds have an element of
"rewarding good behavior". Whether these systems are an efficient
solution to environmental problems depends on a comparison
between the costs of those systems and the costs of alternatives
with equal environmental results. Costs of alternative systems
consists of the expenditures for household waste collection,
dumping and the expenditures of picking up litter. Although no
assessments exist, it is not unreasonable to assume that in many
cases such costs exceed the costs of a deposit refund system which
have the added advantage of eliminating or reducing the incentive
for illegal "midnight dumping" which exists under a simple waste
tax or fee.
Nine states in the U.S., several Canadian provinces, and a
number of European nations have enacted "bottle bills" to control
littering of beverage containers and to reduce the flow of solid
landfills.78 Such systems can be used for some forms of
wastes. Lead acid batteries, used motor oil and vehicle
tires are also potential candidates and a number of proposals are
78 See, e.g., P. BOHM, DEPOSIT REFUND SYSTEMS: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION AND CONSUMER POLICY 110-11 (1981); Menell,
'Beyond the Throwaway Society: An Incentive Approach to Regulating
Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655, 678 (1990).
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now under consideration in the Congress.79 Rhode Island and
Maine have enacted deposit refund systems for automobile
batteries, and Maine has a system for commercial-size pesticide
containers. Denmark has adopted such a plan for high mercury
content and cadmium batteries, and Norway and Sweden have
implemented deposit refund systems for car bodies.8 0
D. REDUCTION OF MARKET BARRIERS
In some cases, environmental protection can be improved
. simply by removing existing government barriers to market
activity. For example, measures that facilitate the voluntary
exchange of water rights can promote more efficient allocation and
use of scarce water supplies, while curbing the need for expensive
and environmentally damaging water supply projects.81 This
approach has recently been adopted in southern California in a
major market-oriented water exchange program.82 (This approach
is examined in detail in the next section). This concept can usefully
be applied in the competitive bidding for solid waste
management.83 Similarly, comprehensive least cost bidding at
79See, e.g., H.R. 2648, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONGoREe. S6636 (1989); H.R.
2462, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONGoREe. S4585 (1990)
80 1. OPSHOOR & H. VOS, supra note 73, at 83-88.
81 Willey & Graff, Federal Water Policy in the United States: An Agenda for
Economic and Environmental Reform, 13 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 325, 349-51
(1988).
82 Morris, llD Approves State's First Water Swap With MWD, IMPERIAL VALLEY
PRESS, Nov. 9, 1988, at I, Col. 6.
83 If communities are to adopt efficient solutions to their solid waste
management programs, they must consider all methods, including surface
disposal, incineration, and recycling on an equal basis.
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electric utilities would promote economically rational energy
generation and consumption by mandating the least cost approach,
whether on the supply or on the demand side. What is needed
before utilities will have incentives· to entertain such
comprehensive least-cost bidding is permission from the state
regulatory agencies for utilities to write demand-side investments
into their rate basis.84
E. ELIMINATION OF UNWANTED GOVERNMENT
SUBSIDIES
In theory subsidies can provide important economic
incentives to address environmental problems, but in practice
many subsidies promote inefficient and environmentally unsound
development. A major example is the U.S. Forest Service's "below-
cost timber sales" which do not even recover the full cost of making
timber available for harvesting by private timber companies. The
result has been inefficient timber cutting on government lands,
which has led to substantial losses of habitat and damages to
watersheds.85 Other examples of programs that may be both
economically inefficient and environmentally unsound include
84 National Energy Policy Act of 1989. S 24, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); See
also Cavanagh, Ralph, Responsible Power Marketing in an Increasingly
Competitive Era, 5 YALE 1. ON REG. 342, 343 (1988).
85 See generally M. BOWES & J. KRUTILLA, MULTIPLE USE MANAGEMENT: THE
ECONOMICSOF PUBLIC FORESTLANDS 16 (1989); H. ANDERSON & C. GEHRKE, I
NATIONALFORESTS, POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, WATER QUALITY AND TIMBER







certain U.S. Army Corps of Engineer's flood control projects,86 U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation projects, and Bureau of Land Management
and Forest Service's public lands grazing programs.87 Gradual
removal of these economically inefficient and environmentally
unsound subsidies would foster environmental protection and,
additionally, increase net federal revenues.
86 See Stavins & Jaffe, Unintended Impacts of Public Investment on Private
Decisions: The Depletion of Forest Wetlands, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 337, 338 (1990).
87 See T. ANDERSON, WATER CRISIS: ENDING THE POLICY DROUGHT 47-52 (1983).
V. PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE WITH INCENTIVE BASED
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICIES
Economic-incentives for environmental protection have been
adopted and implemented in the U.S. and several European nations,
though not on a very large scale. These experiences offer useful
guidance as to the use of this approach in practice and can be used
to develop improved policies.
EPA's EMISSION TRADING PROGRAM
The EPA, starting in 1974, began to experiment with
"emissions trading" as part of its program to improve local air
quality. Firms that reduce emissions below the level required by
law have been allowed to receive "credits" usable against higher
emissions elsewhere. The aim has been to allow polluters greater
in choosing how to control pollution, so as to reduce
overall costs of pollution abatement. Until now, EPA's "controlled
trading options" have included bubbling, netting, offsets and
Bubbles:
The bubble policy treats each plant as if it were surrounded
an imaginary bubble. The plant does not suffer any emissions
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violation unless there is an increase in the net emissions from the
entire plant.88 Thus, emissions from one smoke stack can increase
so long as there is a corresponding decrease from another stack.
Firms are allowed to trade emissions reductions among sources
within the firm, as long as total combined emissions have complied
with an aggregate limit.89 The main attraction of the bubble policy
is that a company can modify its plant and avoid being subject to a
new source review (NSR) by cutting back on another area of
emissions within the same plant.
2. Netting:
The netting policy90 allows the facility to use its own credits
from surplus emissions reductions from that facility to compensate
for increases due to permanent modifications within the same
facility.91 The polluter must reduce emissions from another source
within the same plant so that the "net" increase in plant wide
emissions remains below the specified level. Thus while the bubble
policy creates the credits, netting ensures that the increase in
emissions is not above the limits. Netting accounts for the greatest
percentage of market activity to date.92 The bubbling and netting
88 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43830 (1986).
89 See generally R. LIROFF, THE BUBBLE CONCEPT (1981); Landau, Chevron, USA
v. NRDC: The Supreme Court Declines to Burst EPA's Bubble Concept, 15 ENVTL.
L. 285 (1985); Landau, Economic Dream or Environmental Nightmare? The
Legality of the Bubble Concept in Air and Water Pollution Control, 8 B.C.
ENVTL.AFF. L. REV. 741 (1980).
90 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,830 (1986).
911d.
92 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 68, at 132-33.
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policies were the first signs that the EPA would relax its no growth
stance in non-attainment areas.
3 Offsets:
The offset policy allows economic development in non-
attainment areas «NAA) areas that do not conform with the
minimum standards) through a system that offsets future new
source emissions with present reductions.93 This can be done by
utilities with their own sources or through agreements with other
firms.94
Approval to use emission offsets are granted only if the applicant
meets four requirements. First, the offsets should be such that they
result in reasonable progress towards attaining national ambient
air quality standards (NAAQS).95 Second, the new sources of
emissions must meet an emissions limitation that requires
compliance with the lowest achievable emissions rate for the type
of industry involved.96 Third, the plan requires that all existing
emission sources owned by the applicant be in compliance with the
applicable emissions limitations.97 Fourth, the proposed offsets
a positive net benefit to the air quality of the affected
region.98
93 42 D.S.C. § 7503 (1988).
94 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 68, at 119.
9S 41 Fed. Reg. 55,528, 55,529 (1976).
96 [d. at 55,524, 55,528.




Under the banking programs99 firms can store their emISSIOn
reduction credits to allow either for internal expansion in the
future or for sale of credits to other firms. This provides flexibility
in the use of emissions reductions and allows a company to reap
the benefits of its own emissions cutbacks by using them to offset
future modifications, bubbling or netting.100 Banking assists
growing companies in planning pollution control more rationally. It
also allows states and communities to reap benefits because it
encourages companies to create reductions earlier and to disclose
this information to the state to help in emission control planning.10 1
Although all the above-mentioned programs were codified in
the EPA's Pinal Policy Statement on Emissions Trading in 1986,102
they have not been extensively used, partly because states are not
required to use them and partly because of the uncertainties about
the future course of the programs. Nevertheless, as of 1985, the
EPA had approved 42 bubbles and the states had approved 90. In
addition there had been approximately 2000 offsets and 8000
netting transactions.103
In an early example of the success of this program, General
Motors (GM) sought to construct a new assembly plant that would
emit more than 3000 tons of hydrocarbons every year. OM was
99 44 Fed. Reg. 3,274, 3,280 (1979).
100Id.
101 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,825 (1986).
102 EPA's Final Emissions Trading Policy Statement, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,829
(1986).
103 Hahn & Hester, The Markets for Bads: EPA's Experience With Emissions
Trading, 11 REG. 48, 51 (1987).
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able to obtain ERC's that represented a reduction of 5000 tons of
hydrocarbon emissions each year. Thus OM's new plant resulted in
3000 tons of offsets plus a 2000 ton per year net benefit to air
quality.104 Companies like Armco, DuPont, USX, and 3M have also
traded emissions credits, and a market for transfers has
developed.IOS In 1987, Hahn and Hester calculated that this limited
degree of trading has resulted in more than $4 billion savings in
control costs, with no adverse effect on the air quality,l06 Emissions
trading can be an affirmative tool to achieve environmental
objectives, building on the experience gained by using it to reduce
control costs.
B. TRADABLE PERMITS FOR WATER POLLUTION
Though there is very limited experience with tradable permit
programs for controlling water pollution from non-point sources,107
this experience to date shows that these mechanisms encourage
cost effective-methods of control, lower total cleanup costs and
induce development and adoption of new cleanup technologies.
Non-point sources, particularly from agriculture and urban
run-off, now constitute a major U.S. water pollution problem. The
104 Yuonne F. Lindgren, The Emissions Trading Policy; Some on the Horizon
for Takings Clause Claimants, 18 HSTC. L.Q. 667 (1991).
105 See Main, Here Comes the Big New Cleanup, FORTUNE, Nov. 12, 1988 at 102,
103.
106 Hahn & Hester, supra note 103, at 50.
107 Pollution sources are of two types: (1) waste discharges from identifiable
points (point-sources) and (2) diffused wastes reaching water through land
runoff, washout from the atmosphere, or other means (nonpoint-sources).
The two differ in their amenability to control. Discrete point-sources may be
controlled directly while nonpoint-sources are extremely difficult to control.
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experience of the Dillon Reservoir, a major source of water for the
city of Denver, Colorado, provides an excellent example of a trading
approach that works effectively on non-point source water
pollution.108 In past years, nitrogen and phosphorus loading was
causmg the reservoir to become eutrophic, even though point-
sources from surrounding communities were controlled by best-
available-technology standards. To protect water quality in the face
of rapid population growth, the EPA and the state of Colorado
jointly developed a "point/non-point source control optimization"
program to cut the phosphorus flows that mainly came from urban
and agricultural sources.109
The point/non-point source trading program was developed
with the active participation of environmental groups, industry and
local and state governments, and was approved in 1984 by the
Colorado legislature and the EPA) 10 The program allows for
publicly-owned sewage treatment works (POTWs) to finance the
control of non-point sources in lieu of upgrading their own treated
effluents to drinking water standards. 111 The program is effective
because the cost per pound of phosphorus removed via trading is
$67; the cheapest alternative developed for the POTWs would cost
$824 per pound. EPA has estimated that the plan has made savings
of over $1 million per year compared with the conventional
108 NORTH WEST COLORADO COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, POINT SOURCES-NONPOINT
SOURCE TRADING IN THE LAKE DILLON WATERSHED, FINAL REPORT (1984).
109 See Hahn, Economic Perceptions of Environmental Problems: How the
Patient Followed the Doctors Orders, 3 J. ECON. PERSP. 95 (1986).
110Id.
111 Id. at 103.
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working of four fairly small POTWs.112 Furthermore, to provide a
margin of safety, a 2-to-l ratio on trades is used, requiring controls
over a minimum of two pounds of non-point phosphorus for one
point of credit for a point source. As a result, the plan not only
saves money but also increases the likelihood of achieving
environmen tal improvemen t.113 The same type of program is
currently being developed for nutrients and other pollutants at
other sites in Colorado and elsewhere.114
c. LEAD TRADING
EPA's successful lead trading program approximates the
economist's ideal of a freely functioning market. Lead, which EPA
decided to phase out in gasoline in the early 1970's, was one of the
first pollutants to be regulated under the Clean Air Act.1l5 This
program provided greater flexibility to gasoline refiners in meeting
emission standards during a time when lead in gasoline was being
reduced significantly.
EPA authorized inter-refinery trading of lead credits in
1982.116 Producers were required to reduce lead in gasoline
according to a schedule, but those who did better than the schedule
112 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 27, at 395.
113NORTH WEST COLORADO COUNCIL OF GOVERNMENTS, A BASIN WIDE APPROACH
TO NSP POLLUTION MANAGEMENT, REPORT (1991).
114/d.
115 See MELNICK, supra note 43, at 269-81.
116 Environmental Protection Agency, Regulation of Fuel and Fuel Additives,
47 Fed. Reg. 38,078 (1982) (proposed rule); 47 Fed. Reg. 49,322 (1982) (final
rule) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 80.20 (1988)).
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earned lead credits that could be "banked" and/or sold to those for
whom it was more costly and difficult to achieve schedule targets.
Unlike other programs, the lead trading program had a fixed life
that started in 1982 and terminated in 1987, when the lead phase-
down was complete. Although the program experienced some
implementation difficulties related to the importation of lead fuel,
they were relatively minor and the program was clearly successful.
Trading among firms significantly surpassed that resulting from
earlier air and water emissions trading.117 In 1985, over half of all
refiners participated in trading with other firms and EPA estimated
that resulting savings were about $200 million annually.118
D. VOLUNTARY WATER EXCHANGE
One effective approach to water supply problems is to allow
the voluntary exchange of water rights to increase efficiency, most
notably by creating economic incentives for water conservation. In
the Imperial Irrigation District (lID) of California, farmers pay as
little as $10 for enough water to irrigate an acre of cotton, while a
few hundred miles away in Los Angles, local authorities are paying
as much as $200 for the same amount of water.119 A free market in
water rights allowing voluntary exchanges would help both parties:
Farmers will have a financial stake in conserving water, while
117 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 27, at 380-91.
118See U.S. EPA, COSTS AND BENEFITS OF REDUCING LEAD IN GASOLINE: FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS, Washington, D.C. (1985).
119 Stavins, Harnessing Market Forces to Protect the Environment,
ENVIRONMENT Jan.-Feb. 1989, at 4.
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urban needs would be met without shrinking agriculture and
without building new dams and reservoirs.120
In March 1983, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF)
published a proposal calling for the Metropolitan Water District
(MWD) to finance the modernization of lID's water system in
exchange for conserved water.121 In November 1988, after five
years of negotiation, a $230 million water conservation and
transfer agreement was finally agreed upon.122 Recent reports
indicate greatly increased interest in water marketing in Colorado,
New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, Utah and California.123
E. CALIFORNIA INITIATIVES
An important aspect of the Clean Air Act is its policy to
empower the states to tailor their own pollution control policies to
meet their individual needs. This is done by setting air quality
standards, or national ambient air quality standards (NAAQS), at
the federal level, and delegating to the states the task of creating
their own implementation plans.124 California has taken a number
of initiatives under this provision to encourage market activities to
improve the environment.
120 See Willey & Graff, supra note 81, at 345.
121R. STA VINS, TRADING CONSERVATION INVESTMENTS FOR WATER: A PROPOSAL
FOR THE METROPOLITAN WATER DISTRICT FOR SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA TO OBTAIN
ADDITIONAL COLORADO RIVER WATER BY FINANCING WATER CONSERVATION
INVESTMENTS (1983).
122See Morris, supra note 82.
123 See,e.g., Atchinson, Where Water is Money in the Bank, BUS.WK., Aug. 15,
1988, at 50.
12442 D.S.C. § 7410 (1988).
45
The Air Resources Act (ARA) of California adopts an offset
policy125 and outlines procedures for the registration and transfer
of emission reduction credits (ERC's).126 Furthermore, the California
legislature, via Public Utilities Code section 740.2, has directed the
California Commission to encourage activities designed to achieve
"substantial market penetration of electric and compressed natural
gas fueled vehicles".127 Also, the California Revenue and Tax Code
section 17052.11 provides tax credits of up to $750,000 state-wide
for converting to low emission motor vehicles)28 Such efforts to
improve California's air quality have resulted in renewed interest
in low emission vehicles (LIV's), especially because California's
traditional lead in tightening vehicle emission and air quality tend
to reach the other states in a domino-like effect.
California's South Coast Air Quality Management District has
proposed a plan to permit the exchange of smog trading rights
among as many as 24,000 factories, refineries, bakeries and other
installations that produce nitrogen oxide and hydrocarbons, the
major chemical ingredients of smog in the Los Angles Basin.129 This
is expected to be the first mass market in pollution trading and is
expected to go well beyond the existing trading schemes, including
the acid rain provisions of the Clean Air Act. All these plans are
125CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 40709 (Deering 1986).
126Id. § 40711; An ERC is a permanent, quantifiable enforceable emISSIOns
reduction beyond the level required by regulations. This is the currency of
the emissions trading market approach.
127 Lori A. Burkhart, On the Road to a Cleaner Environment, 128 PUB. U.
FORTNIGHTLY,32 (1991).
128 Id.
129 Scott Armstrong, L.A. Smog: Pollution Trading in LA-LA Land. MONITOR.
June 12, 1991.
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relatively new, and the beneficial impact is difficult to measure. At
any rate they should provide a test of how well market
mechanisms curb pollution.
F. LAND TRUSTS
Land trusts are regional, local, state-wide and national non-
profit organizations involved in protecting important land and
water resources for the public benefit. They motivate land owners
to enter into conservation easements to protect the environment. A
major motivation of entering into these easements, besides the love
of nature, is self-interest. In return for the easement rights, land
owners may realize economic incentives in the form of federal and
state income-tax and estate-tax benefits. The growing interest in
land trusts can be attributed largely to the existence of these tax
incentives. There are now more than 900 land trusts in the U.S ..
Their rapid growth has helped to protect 2.7 million acres of land in
the U.S. so far. A Land Trust Association 1990 survey indicates that
between 1988 and 1990 the number of land trusts increased by 20
percent, helping preserve an additional 30 percent land.130
G. OTHER EXAMPLES
Experience with market principles goes well beyond the SIX
examples noted above. Congress has been creating new incentive-
130 Note, Land Trusts Have Helped Protect 2.7 Million Acres, EXCHANGE,
Spring 1991.
47
based legislation for a diverse set of problems. These include: (1)
EPA's tradable permit system for implementing the Montreal
Protocol's stratospheric ozone-depletion restrictions,131 (2) the
Battery Research and Recycling Act of 1989 that requires motor
vehicle battery wholesalers and retailers to accept old batteries
from the purchasers of new ones and authorizes state and local
government adoption of motor vehicles deposit-refund systems,132
and (3) the Consumer Protection Recovery Act of 1989 that
combines recycling targets for municipal and solid waste disposal
with tradable permits in order to distribute recycling burdens
among firms in a cost-effective manner.133 This latter act has also
prompted some states to adopt a deposit-refund system for
beverage containers.
Elsewhere, a number of European nations including West
Germany, France and The Netherlands, have used economic
incentives for environmental protection.134 An expert panel of the
European Commission studying market incentives recommends the
use of economic market incentives including taxes, so as to
integrate environmental policy into all economic policy-making.135
131 53 Fed. Reg. 30,566, 30,567 (1988); See also Hahn & MacGartland, The
Political Economy of Instrument Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in
il Implementing the Montreal Protocol, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 592, 598-604 (1989).
132 H.R. 3735, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
133135 CONGoREC. § 6636 (1989).
134 See generally J. OPSCHOOR & H. VOS, supra note 73.
135 See note, Interview: Europe Will Integrate Economics and Environment,
GREENWIRE,July 24, 1991.
VI. ANALYSIS OF A SELECT MODEL (THE ACID RAIN
TITLE)
Title IV, the acid rain title of the Clean Air Act Amendments
1990,136 is a landmark of innovative clean air legislation. It is
Congress' first market-based approach to pollution control. This
section evaluates the market system established under this Title.
A. GENERAL STRUCTURE AND WORKING
Title IV involves the free trading of sulphur dioxide (S02)
"allowances" which is expected to provide flexibility, efficiency and
conservation in solving pollution problems. It authorizes EPA to
issue sulphur dioxide emissions allowances each year to existing
units covered by the Act. Each allowance is a transferable license to
emit a ton of sulphur dioxide)37 The allowances are expressed in
tons per year rather than an emission rate, such as pounds per
hour, or milligrams per liter. Annual allowances facilitate the
assessment of the cumulative effect of sulphur dioxide on the
environment; it is the total acid loading on a lake that causes
acidification, not the concentration of sulphur dioxide in the
atmosphere at any particular time. License transferability gives the
136 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399
(1990).
137 § 402(3), 403(b), 42 V.S.C. § 7651a(3), 7651b(b).
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industry the flexibility to distribute their emISSIOns over the course
of the year without sacrificing environmental policy goals.
To ensure that the emission reductions achieved by the new
regulations are not offset by increased emissions from other
sources such as new plants, the Title places an overall limit on such
sources. To enforce this ceiling, the law limits the total number of
allowances issued each year to 8.9 million138 and imposes harsh
penalties on plants whose emissions exceed the limit.139 This
encourages new plants to buy allowances from other units. The acid
rain regulations cover most new and existing fossil fuel-fired
electric steam generating stations with a capacity of at least 25
megawatts. These provisions are to be implemented 10 two phases.
1. Phase I Allowance Allocations
Phase I, beginning January 1, 1995, will cover approximately
110 large electric utility, high sulphur dioxide-level-emitting plants
that are listed in Table A of section 404 of the Clean Air Act
Amendments.140 They will receive allowances according to a chart
which provides each unit with allowances equal to 2.5 Ibs/MMbtu
multiplied by the units baseline fuel consumption (the average
annual fuel consumed in 1985 through 1987, expressed in millions
of Btu.).
Utilities will be provided with vanous allowance-based
incentives to encourage them to use scrubbers on their units. Units
138 § 403(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a).
139 § 411, 42 U.S.C. § 76510).
140 §§ 404(a)(1), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 7651(k).
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that agree to install scrubbers by 1997 need not reduce emissions
until 1997 instead of 1995.141 Such units will also receive a two-
for-one bonus allowance; one bonus allowance for each ton of
emission reduction that they may achieve below the 1.2
Lbs/MMbtu emission level.142 These allowances can also be banked
for future use. The sum of bonus two-for-one allowances and the
extra allowances issued under this scheme may not, however,
exceed 3.5 million tons.143 The allowances may be awarded to the
utilities as and when they are earned. This procedure gives utilities
the incentive to complete their compliance plans early. All this
maximizes the scope of alternatives such pollution sources have for
complying with their emission limitations requirements.
Utilities that use energy conservation measures or renewable
energy to reduce emissions, even before they are covered by the
acid rain regulations, will receive extra allowances.144 In addition
to these incentive allowances, some extra allowances per year will
also be allocated among utilities in Indiana, Ohio and Illinois during
Phase I, in proportion to each utilities Phase I allowances.145
2. Phase II Allowance Allocations
In Phase II, beginning January 1, 2000, all utility units with
output capacity of 25 M.W. or more will be included in the
allowance trading scheme. This phase provides more allowances to
141 § 404(d)(1), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(d)(1).
142 § 404(d)(6), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(d)(6).
143 § 404(a), 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(a).
144 § 404(f) , 42 V.S.C. § 7651c(f).
145 § 404 (a)(3), 42 V.S.c. § 7651c(a)(3).
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relatively clean units and to units with low utilization rates during
the baseline period. For example, coal-fired units that operate at
less than 60 percent of their capacity during the 1985-87 baseline
period146 or had emission rates below· 1.2 Ibs./ MMbtu,147 can
receive bigger allowances based on a 60 percent capacity factor
baseline for 2000-2009. It also contains special formulas for
several other categories of plants148 and extends the Phase II
compliance deadline by four years to units that will use new
technologies to reduce environmental damage.149 Most units that
begin operating after November 15, 1990, are not eligible for
allowance allocations, except those that were under construction on
that date.150 To cover their sulphur dioxide emissions these new
plants will have to buy their allowances from similar units or from
the open market.
Beginning with Phase II, the emissions will be capped at 8.9
million tons per year (not counting the special and bonus
allowances). If the total number exceeds the limit, the total
allocation for each unit will be reduced proportionately on a pro-
rata basis, in an aggregate amount equal to the excess allocations
that would otherwise be made to maintain the cap. IS! Although the
cap on the emissions has been criticized on the ground that it may
inhibit trading by giving the existing sources an incentive to retain
146 § 405(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(d)(2).
147 § 405(d)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(d)(3).
148 § 405(h), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(h); § 405(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7651d(i); § 405(j), 42
U.S.C. § 7651d(j).
149 § 409, 42 U.S.C. § 7651h.
150 § 403(e), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(e).
151 § 403(a), 42 U.S.C. § 7651b(a).
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excess allowances,152 it ensures that the realized reductions are
permanent. Furthermore, a limit on the available emissions
allowances is essential for the development of the market.153
3. Establishing a Market
The central and most innovative feature of the acid rain
legislation is the right to transfer emissions freely.154 This is the
key both to the strong environmental policy sought in this law and
to the flexibility it creates in choosing the best means of complying
with their emissions obligations. The allowance market's flexibility
should reduce overall compliance costs substantially and provide
the utilities with the opportunity to save money and even profit.
Since units can gain revenues from the sale of allowances they do
not use, they will have a strong financial incentive both to make
greater-than-required reductions and to make reductions earlier
than required.
A utility may also make an intra-utility allowance transfer,
where it may re-assign allowances from one unit to the other, if the
re-assigned results total no more than the original total emissions.
This provision gives the utility the flexibility to focus its pollution
control activities on facilities where emission reductions can be
achieved most cheaply. It stimulates innovations in the
technologies and the strategies used to reduce emissions and
152 Temple, Baker & Sloane, Inc., Economic Evaluation of H.R. 3030/S. 1490:
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1989, (prepared for The Edison Electric
Institute, August 1989).
153 S. REP. NO. 228, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 324 (1989).
154 § 403(b), 42 D.S.C. § 7651b(b).
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encourages sources to exploit energy efficiency, enhanced emissions
control technologies and fuel switching. Utilities can reduce their
emissions by installing scrubbers, using clean coal innovative
technologies, building cleaner plants, buying power from others or
promoting conservation. Utilities can select those corrective
measures that they are most comfortable with and schedule their
compliance efforts as and when they like within the year.
The new sulphur dioxide allowances system operates like a
checking account that is monitored only at the end of each year and
that carries forward the unused allowances to the next year .155
This banking of allowances enables utilities to benefit from over-
compliance in any given year.
Allowances are freely transferable among designated
representatives of the owners or operators of the affected sources
or any person who holds the allowance.156 The act uses very broad
language in describing the persons who can transfer these rights.
But transfers will not go into effect until they are registered with
the EPA.157 The law imposes no geographic restrictions on the
transfer of allowances. For example, a utility in Georgia can buy
allowances from a utility in California and vice versa.
4. Auctions and Direct Sales
To foster a private allowance trading market and to ensure
that utilities which are building new units have access to




allowances, the law requires EPA to sell a small number of
allowances each year; some at auction and others on a fixed price
on a first come first serve basis.158 EPA will auction 150,000
allowances each Phase I year, and 200,000 allowances each Phase
II year. 50,000 allowances for 1995 will be auctioned in 1993 to
1995 and 150,000 will be auctioned for each year between 1996
and 1999. For each Phase II year, 100,000 of the allowances will be
auctioned seven years in advance and the remaining 100,000 will
be auctioned in the year for which the allowances will be issued. 159
Under the sale provisions, EPA will sell 50,000 allowances for each
Phase II year at $1,500 per ton. Half of these are to be sold seven
years before they mature, starting 1993 and the other half for
immediate use, beginning in the year 2000. Priority will be gIven to
the utilities that show that they have been unable to buy
allowances in the open market,160 All this could open enormous
financial resources for the government.
5. Monitoring and Enforcement Requirements
All units covered by the act must ensure continuous readouts
of all emissions by installing emissions monitors. This emissions
monitoring has been compared to a bank's responsibility to keep
track of its transactions to the smallest unit, the penny. CEM
systems, therefore, must enable a company to account for, and the
EPA to keep track, of sulphur dioxide emissions and allowances "to
158 § 416, 42 D.S.C. § 76510.
159 § 416(c), 42 D.S.C. § 76510(c)
160 [d.
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the penny". Phase I units must install the monitors by November
15, 1993 and Phase II by January 1, 1995.161
The allowance system attempts to reverse the economic
equation so that the sources have an Incentive to comply, and the
provisions of this section will be crucial in determining whether a
source has complied or not. The enforcement and monitoring
requirement also allows the EPA to ensure that emissions
reductions by sellers match the emissions increases by buyers.
Since the buyers will need to demonstrate by the year end that
they have acquired sufficient allowances to cover their annual
emissions, there will be a built-in incentive to record and report
emissions.162 The language of the bill specifically states that when
the monitoring system is not working, the sources will be presumed
to be emitting at an uncontrollable rate.163 Thus, there is an
incentive to have monitors working all the time because, if they are
not working the source's emissions will be presumed to be quite a
bit higher and will erode all credits.
6 • Excess Emissions Fee
Utilities that exceed their limit shall be required to pay a
penalty of $2000 for each excess ton and a reduction of the
following years allowances by an amount equal to the excess.164 For
example, if a utility receives 400 tons of allowances every year, but
161 § 412, 42 V.S.C. § 7651k.
162 See note, Acid Rain, Emissions Trading and the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1989, 15 COLUM. 1. ENVTL. L. 329, 345-55 (1990).
163 § 412(d), 42 V.S.C. § 7651.
164 § 411,42 V.S.C. § 7651k.
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emits 500 tons of sulphur dioxide in the year 2000, the excess
emissions will be deducted from the 400 ton allowance it will
otherwise receive for the year 2001. This payback requirement IS
designed to ensure that cumulative sulphur dioxide emissions do
not increase. As the continuous monitoring system is capable of
detecting violations, the financial penalty for excess emissions,
combined with the requirement that any excess emissions will be
offset by emissions reductions in the following year, should serve
as a significant deterrent to potential violators.165
B. COMPARATIVE COMMENTS
Title IV provides utilities with an enormous opportunity to
creatively choose various alternatives to comply with the
regulations. Utilities can benefit greatly by choosing to enter into
joint ventures with other utilities, industrial sources, pollution
control equipment manufacturers and other interested parties, to
control and reduce their emissions, thereby bringing about a
mutually beneficial system and a least cost allocation of control
burdens. It is important, however, for the utilities to choose the
best mix of strategies and to consider a wide variety of
institutional, regulatory and planning considerations to decide how
best to comply with the title.
165 Permit violations may also be subject to administrative, civil or criminal
enforcement actions. S 1490, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989); S 1630, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 601 (1989).
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For markets to function properly, there must be a proper
blend of active participants to support it.166 First, there must be an
adequately large number of traders with enough need for
allowances to ensure that some will buy and some will sell. Second,
they must have an incentive to trade. Finally, the transaction costs
must be sufficiently low to maintain the incentive.167 For the
transaction costs to be low buyers and the sellers should be able to
easily identify each other, and accurate information must be
readily available to the buyers so they can make a cost benefit
analysis. Ideally, trading procedure rules should be uniform from
state to state.
The amendment fulfills all these conditions. The similarity
among the entities within the regulated industry and the limited
number of regulated sources under the scheme should lower the
transaction costs of sales by simplifying searches for transaction
partners. Further, the amendment's combination of auctions and
standard sales can aid the development of a price indicator, helping
the utilities in making a cost benefit analysis. Another factor
influencing the transaction costs is the simplicity of the trading
process. For example, if every trade requires the extensive paper
work and approval through numerous bureaucratic channels, the
transaction costs would escalate. Here, extensive oversight or
complex procedures are unnecessary as the permits held by
sources are like accounts held with EPA. When a trade is made, the
166 See Hahn & Noll, Barriers to Implementing Tradable Air Pollution
Permits: Problems of Regulatory Interactions, 1 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 66 (1983).
167 See Hahn & Hester, supra note 68, at 140-41.
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buyer's account is credited and the seller's account is debited by
the trade. This system is no more complicated than a normal
checking account.
Other potential weaknesses of the trading system have also
been mitigated. For example, the problem of hoarding is minimized.
The trading region of this system covers the entire country, while
competition of the regulated industry is normally only at the local
level. Thus, it is unlikely that the participants can ever manipulate
the market to erect a barrier to competition. A new plant should
easily be able to find a seller in a different part of the country. The
annual auction and the direct sales of allowances also ensure the
availability of allowances at regular intervals. The acid rain
provisions also protect against the possible localized concentrations
of pollution that may cause health effects or may cause other local
environmental impacts, as the program is an overlay on a pre-
existing program and works in a range where the threshold for
protection against localized effects has already been achieved.
In sum, the amendment's market scheme is designed for
success. It embodies a strictly guarded emissions cap, a simple
trading process, incentives to encourage active trading and a
manageable compliance method. However, success or failure of the
system will depend substantially on how the EPA administers the
program. Its rule-making and the implementation process must be
designed to allow the regulated participants to efficiently access the
benefits inherent in the trading program. If so, this market
approach to the acid rain program will shape large segments of U.S.
environmental law and regulation in the future.
VII. ISSUES OF SPECIAL FOCUS
This part details several new approaches to deal with some
urgent environmental problems that have eluded solution by
traditional policy measures, and develops a series of
recommendations as to how economic strategies could be useful
tools with which to approach these problems.
A. SOLID AND HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
Serious problems are arising from the massive quantity of
solid and hazardous waste now being generated. They include
among others: shortages of capacity of landfills and other
conventional means of disposing of municipal solid waste; human
exposure to toxic substances found in hazardous and industrial
solid waste; and ecological impacts from improper hazardous waste
disposal. According to a report issued by the EPA, more than one
third of the nation's landfills will be full by the end of 1992.168
With landfill capacity on the decline, many states have turned to
incineration as a means of solving their solid waste problems, but
concerns exist that garbage burning contributes to air pollution
problems and generates hazardous ash which must itself be
168 See U.S. EPA, THE SOLID WASTE DILEMMA: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION 8 (1989).
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disposed of safely.169 Despite the magnitude of the problem,
Americans continue to generate and dispose of more solid waste,
both per capita and total, than the residents of any other country
on earth.170 It has been estimated that between 1970 and 1988,
the total quantity of disposed solid waste grew more than 37
percent, with discards per capita growing by 14 percent.171
The sources of toxic substances released into the environment
are both numerous and diverse: every day each of us uses a variety
of products and services which generate hazardous wastes. Most
estimates place the total annual hazardous waste generation at
between 250 to 500 million tons.172 Another perspective on the
size of the problem is provided by the costs associated with various
regulations aimed at cleaning up or maintaining disposal sites. The
best available estimates indicate aggregate national cleanup costs in
the range of $300 to $750 billion by the year 2000.173
At the core of most of these problems are flawed price signals
which fail to bring to the attention of consumers and producers the
real costs of the wastes they generate. The cost of throwing away
an additional item of refuse has been zero. Residents merely need
to place their waste in the trash can or at the curbside and this
waste disappears when the municipality picks it up. Although there
169 See Yakowitz & Harvey, Incineration of Municipal Solid Waste: Scientific
and Technical Evaluation of the State-of-the-Art by an Expert Panel, 4
Resources, Conservation & Recycling 241-252 (1990).
170 See WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE, WORLD RESOURCES 1986,252 (1986).
171U. S. EPA, CHARACTERIZATION OF MUNICIPAL SOLID WASTE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1990 UPDATE, 6 (1990).
172U.S. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT:
RECENT CHANGES AND POLICY ALTERNATIVES, Washington, D.C., May 1985.
173 See U.S. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 1987, op. cit..
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are costs of disposal that people pay, 174 these costs are not related
to the quantity or the toxicity of the waste they throwaway.
The government at all levels has been slow to respond to this
crisis, but many states, municipalities arid the federal government
have started taking some action. In 1990, Congress introduced 75
bills dealing with the problem and EPA announced a national goal
of reducing solid waste by 25 percent by 1992 and 50 percent by
1997 via recycling,175 Many states and localities have also adopted
a variety of command-and-control strategies to limit waste and
increase recycling, and nine states have enacted deposit-refund
systems for beverage containers.176 Although these policies
respond to some of the symptoms of the solid waste "crisis" they do
not systematically address its causes, since they fail to remedy the
distorted incentives that underline consumer and manufacturer
behavior which foster the "throwaway ethic". Given the
environmental and direct private costs of disposing of wastes by
traditional means, it is important to provide appropriate incentives
for those who generate and manage the waste to economize in their
use of materials, make better use of wastes they generate and
dispose of the remaining wastes in environmentally sound ways.
Fundamental to an effective waste management strategy is
the removal of these distortions by getting the prices right.
Decisions by consumers and firms should reflect the incremental
costs of waste disposal. The following approaches (some already in
174 See D. WILSON, WASTE MANAGEMENT: PLANNING, EVALUATION, TECHNOLOGIES
31 (1981).
175 See U.S. EPA, supra note 171.
176See BOHM, supra note 78.
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place in a few places) hold promIse for accomplishing this, each
focusing on a different point in the product life cycle:
1. Unit Prices For Waste ColleCtion
Under this program households and businesses pay for
disposal based on the volume of waste they generate.l77 This
creates a strong incentive to reduce the quantity of waste
generated, either through changes in purchasing habits or reuse of
products and containers. It also provides incentives for the
households to separate the recyclable components of their trash.
Unit pricing programs are in place in Seattle,Washington and
Pennsylvania.178 Pennsylvania has adopted a "bag and tag" system
which allows households to dispose of refuse only in specially
designed trash bags sold by the municipality. This program has
been very successful, with the total amount of waste falling by 60
percent in the program's first year and the total costs decreasing by
40 percent.179 A corollary approach adopted in Seattle allows the
customers to choose from four sizes of cans which are charged
differently.180 However, it can be a little problematic as customers
are charged for a full can even if it is only partially filled, giving
them the incentive to fill a can. To remedy this problem, Seattle IS
177See Peter S. Menell, Beyond the Throwaway Society: An incentive
Approach to Regulating Municipal Solid Waste, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 655 (1990).
178See Skumatz, Lisa A., Variable Rates: Using Your Rate Structure to
Encourage Waste Reduction and Recycling, Presentation to GRCDA
Conference Feb 14, 1990.
179 See Paul, Bill, Pollution Solution: Pennsylvania Town Finds Way to Get
Locals to Recycle Trash, WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 2, 1989.
180SEATI'LE SOLID WASTE UTILITY, PUBLIC INFORMATION DEPARTMENT.




now experimenting with weight-based rates under which the
customers are charged according to the weight of the waste they
generate, to be measured by meters placed in the specially
designed trash cans.
Unit pricing has obvious limitations in case of those multi-unit
dwellings where residents can dispose of their waste anonymously,
thus free riding on the charges paid by others. In such situations,
unit charges at the building level can at least provide incentives to
landlords to encourage residents to conserve on their waste
generation. There may be some limitations and obstacles but these
can be overcome by taking different approaches. Whatever the
approach, an accurate unit pricing of municipal solid waste
provides a promising approach that combines cost-effectiveness
with a minimum amount of inconvenience to those affected.
2. Retail Disposal And Virgin Material Charges
The retail disposal approach levies a fee at the point of
product purchase to cover the cost of waste disposal. Such
programs can be used where the unit price curbside collection
approach is impractical due to the prevalence of large multi-unit
residences or where the full cost of disposal is disproportionate to
its volume.
Compared with unit prices, retail disposal charges have the
potential advantage of removing incentives for illegal dumping,
since disposal costs would be incurred by individuals when the
products were purchased, not when they were thrown away. There
are, however, some critical concerns associated with them. For
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example, it is questionable whether charges would be set high
enough to influence consumer behavior. It is also not possible to
know the social disposal cost at the time of purchase since the cost
depends on where and how the consumer uses and disposes the
prod uc 1.181 Further such programs are likely to be complicated to
implement with consequently high administrative costs. So it seems
unlikely that such charges would have much impact on purchasing
and disposal habits and resulting solid waste problems.
Another strategy would be the imposition of virgin material
charges at the point of production.182 This would encourage both
firms and consumers to switch to materials and products with
lower disposal costs. It would also encourage recycling as the vIrgIn
materials would cost more that the other ones. A principal
advantage of the virgin material charges would be their relative
ease of administration, particularly in comparison with retail
disposal charges. A disadvantage of this system would be its
insensitivity to local conditions, since these charges would be
needed to be computed on a standardized national basis. Therefore,
while virgin material charges may be effective in creating demand
for recyclable materials, they may not be as effective as unit prices
in encouraging the right mix of recycling and disposal technologies.
3. Recycling Credit Programs
Recycling is an important element of viable waste
management strategies since it reduces the amount of solid waste
181 See Menell, supra note 177.
182 [d.
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that ends up in landfills. However, as more states and
municipalities adopt recycling programs, the increased supply of
recovered materials has often outpaced demand in secondary
markets. Without a buyer, recyclable garbage is still garbage.183
Much of the pollution and waste now entering the environment
results from consumer products such as newspapers, used
automobile oils, tires, and many others which can be recycled but
are not due to weak recycling markets and lower cost opportunities
for plain disposal.
Recycling credit programs would set recycled content goals
for the industry and allow the private sector to determine the least
cost approach of meeting the goals. Under this approach, firms
trade and sell credits to reach overall industry recycling goals.
Producers and importers who lack the current capacity to recycle
purchase such credits from recyclers either indefinitely or until it
becomes economic for them to develop recycling facilities either on
their own or in a joint venture.184 The result of this tradable permit
program would be that the total costs of compliance are less, since
the firms in the best position to recycle are essentially paid by
other firms to undertake the bulk of the recycling burden.
Recycling credit systems can be used for a variety of products
such as newspapers, lead acid batteries, lubricating oil and tires.
For example, a tire recycling credit program establishes some
uniform content requirement for all manufacturers and uses
183 See, e.g., Gold, Allan, As Trash is Recycled Where Can it All Go?, NEW YORK
TIMES, Oct 3 1990 p. B4.
184 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONGo REC. S 16514 (1989).
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tradable permits to achieve industry-wide aggregate standards
while providing substantial flexibility to individual firms.185
Similarly, a lead acid battery recycling credit program would first
establish a recycled content standard and then allow individual
firms to meet their targets by purchasing credits from battery
manufacturers who exceed their targets.186
4. Deposit-Refund Programs
Under a deposit-refund program, consumers pay a special
charge or deposit when purchasing specific goods, that is refunded
after the product is turned in for recycling or proper disposal. This
system is optimal for hazardous products which pose a significant
threat to health or ecological impacts, for which the prevention of
improper disposal is particularly important. The size of the deposit
can depend on the social cost of the product being disposed of.
These systems have the advantage of greatly reducing the
government's monitoring burdens from a nearly impossible one of
preventing illegal dumping, to assuring that the products being
returned for refund are what they are alleged to be. Further more
firms are provided with incentives to look for less environmentally
damaging substances on which the deposit-refund system does not
apply, thus speeding up research for substitutes.187
Deposit-refund systems are currently employed In the form
of "bottle bills" in nine states in the U.S. and several provinces of
185101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 136 CONGoREC. S 4585 (1990).
186 See generally Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61.
187See Clifford S. Russell, Economic Incentives in the Management of
Hazardous Wastes, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. (1988).
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Canada. In Michigan, for example, the return rate of containers was
95 percent after its first year of operation,188 and in Oregon
littering was greatly reduced.189
Deposit-refund systems have beeri proposed for a variety of
products, but are most effective for products like lead acid
batteries, certain industrial chemicals and lubricating oils whose
improper disposal impose very high costs.190 They offer the
advantages of being self-financing and promoting decentralized
actions to correct improper disposal.
For most communities the best way to address the solid and
hazardous waste crisis is to ensure that the consumers bear the
true costs of disposing of their refuse. The above programs make it
possible to impose such costs on the consumers while at the same
time significantly reducing the administrative costs and burdens.
B. FEDERAL WATER POLICY
The severe droughts experienced in California last year and
two years ago in other parts of the West make clear that water is
not an unlimited resource. Surface reservoirs in many parts of the
country have been drawn down to record low levels, and
overdrafts of numerous aquifers is accelerating. Toxic
contamination of ground water, acidification of lakes, and global
188See Porter Richard, Michigan's Experience With Mandatory Deposits on
Beverage Containers, 59 LAND ECONOMICS 177 (1983).
189U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, SOLID WASTE: TRADEOFF INVOLVED IN
BEVERAGE CONTAINER DEPOSIT LEGISLATION, GAO/RCED-91-25 (1990).
190 See Clifford S. Russell, supra note 187.
68
warming have further compounded the array of unsolved problems
of dwindling supplies, polluted surface waters, and declining
aquatic and wetland habitats for fish and wildlife. Unfortunately,
federal water policies have intensified and not lessened these
problems.191
1. Incentives For Improved Supplies
Under the current system, there are no incentives to induce
water users to take actions consistent with current economic,
environmental, and social values associated with water resources.
This lack of appropriate incentives results in inefficient use of
existing supplies, as individuals do not bear the full social costs of
their daily water use decisions. Just as free markets for other goods
result in the efficient availability of those goods, when and where
needed, water markets can facilitate the availability of supplies at
the least overall cost,192
An effective approach to current water supply problems is to
support development of federal and state policies which facilitate
the voluntary buying and selling of water rights by individuals,
firms and other organizations, thereby creating economic incentives
for water conservation in order to increase the efficiency of the
system. A market for water works like any other market. Owners
of water supply offer their water for sale and users offer to buy it,
with the two parties negotiating an agreeable price. As this type of
transaction is repeated by many other buyers and sellers, an
191 See, Willey & Graff, supra note 81.
192 [d.
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efficient and competitive water market develops which balances
supply and demand without the need for government control over
water distribution. Creating water markets would provide
environmental benefits in two ways: first, by reallocating existing
water supplies to new demands thus reducing the need for
additional water-storage facilities and second, providing incentives
for making an efficient use of water and encouraging conservation.
The experience of an agreement between farmers and the
Metropolitan Water District in the Los Angles Area, discussed in
chapter V demonstrates the potential of this approach.193 Increased
interest in marked-based water transactions elsewhere in
California and in Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah
reflect the fact that they can work well in many situations.194 They
are voluntary agreements that reflect the judgement of the parties
involved, that mutual benefits can be realized. Many of the
informational costs necessary to realize the benefits are borne by
the parties themselves and these transfers bring about a more
efficient use of scarce resources.
A concern with the use of these markets is that the economIC
values of water resources are well defined for some resources, but
not for others.195 Water transfers can, however, be used for direct
environmental benefits as demonstrated by the Nature
193 See Moriss, supra note 82.
194 See Atchinson, supra note 123.
195 See Willey & Graff, supra note 81.
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Conservancy which has begun an active program of acquiring water
rights to areas that carry critical habitat.196
Another important concern regarding market-oriented water
transfers is their potential impact on third parties. While water
marketing holds promise of aggregate economic and environmental
benefits, this does not exclude the possibility of negative
consequences for some areas including rural communities 10 the
West.197 It will therefore be essential for changes in federal and
state law to provide adequate protection to such third party
interests, while facilitating voluntary exchanges of water rights.
2. Incentives For Improved Quality
Market-based mechanisms can be used effectively for
improving not just the quantity but also the water quality
problems that we face today. Most of the water pollution control
laws in the U.S. have been directed exclusively at point sources,
such as factories and municipal waste-treatment facilities. Because
municipal landfills and toxic waste dumps in the U.S. cause a
significant amount of non-point contamination of both ground
water and surface water supplies, the various recommendations for
solid and hazardous problems discussed in section A of this chapter
address this concern as well.
196 See Wigington, Robert, Update on Market Strategies for the Protection of
Western lnstream Flows and Wet Lands, Natural Resource Law Center, June.
1990.
197 See Oggins, Cy R. & Helen M. Ingram, Does Anybody Win? The Community
Consequences of Urban-to-Rural Water Transfers: An Arizona Perspective,
Udall Center for Studies in Public Policy, Univ. of Arizona, Tucson, May 1990.
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Market mechanisms can also be utilized to combat water
pollution from point sources. Most of the water pollution control
laws are directed exclusively at point sources; while holding each
source to specified limits, they do not restrain the total volume of
discharges within a basin. They rely primarily on discharge permits
issued by regulatory agencies, with pollution limits based on the
available control technologies. They fail to provide incentives for
improved pollution control devices. The establishment of an overall
watershed limit and the implementation of tradable permits within
it may be the best way to achieve water quality goals)98 While
developing this system, it would be useful to take guidance from
the tradable permit system established for acid rain control under
Title IV of the Clean Air Act amendments of 1990) 99
Dispersed non-point sources, including farms and urban run-
offs, have not been adequately addressed, in part because these
sources are much more difficult to control, particularly by
conventional methods.200 While tradable permits may work
effectively for point sources, the problems with implementing them
for non-point sources are significant. First, there is frequently little
data available with which to establish baseline emissions levels;
second, monitoring can be particularly difficult and; third in some
cases it may be difficult to identify responsible parties.201 More
198 See the discussions for tradable permit systems for acid ram reduction in
chapter VI.
199 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat.
2399 (1990).
200 See Willey & Graff, sup ra note 81.
201 Peskin, Henery M., Nonpoint Pollution & National Responsibility, 83
RESOURCES 10 (1986).
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conventional regulatory policies should therefore play a dominant
role in defining and enforcing permits, but given the current
shortage of viable approaches to nonpoint sources pollution, market
approaches should at least be considered in certain situations.
The experience of Dillon reservoir, the major source of water
in the city of Denver (already discussed in chapter IV), provides an
excellent example of the trading approach working effectively for
both point and non-point source of pollution. The same type of
program can be developed elsewhere for nutrients and for other
water pollutants.202
c. GLOBAL WARMING (INTERNATIONAL TRADING
PROGRAM)
Of the many environmental problems that have arisen SInce
the beginning of the industrial revolution, few have posed greater
risks than the threat of global climate change due to the
greenhouse effect. As a result of our activities, the concentration of
certain gases like carbon dioxide (C02) and other greenhouse gases
like methane (CH4), nitrous oxides (N20), and chloroflorocarbons
(CFC) are increasing, augmenting the greenhouse effect and thereby
raising the possibility of climate changes across the globe. Despite
the near universal scientific agreement about the theory behind the
greenhouse effect, there remains substantial uncertainty regarding
the rate, magnitude, timing and regional implications of future
202 See supra notes 108 & 109.
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climate changes caused by human activities. It is well within the
realm of possibility, however, that climate changes will be large
enough to engender significant social, environmental and economic
costs.203
The industrialized nations are primarily responsible for the
buildup of these gasses in the atmosphere though in the future,
emissions from developing nations will match and eventually
surpass those in the developed world. The most troubling obstacle
to address this problem has been how to allocate control
responsibilities among nations. If we make a uniform pledge to an
X percentage of carbon dioxide worldwide, that would have very
predictable and differential effects on individual countries.
Countries like China and India which have large indigenous sources
of coal would find it very difficult to meet that pledge in
comparison to other countries.
A system of an international trading program in greenhouse
gases would be an effective way of allocating the costs of global
warming prevention among nations and would give countries a
good deal more flexibility to deal with the problem in a way that
does not have clear winners or losers, but a more level-playing
field.204 It would be more equitable than an approach requiring all
countries, rich and poor, new and old contributors to environmental
hazards, to use the same control technology. A tradable permit
program would be a new application of the market-based
approaches already applied in the U.S. to lead-permit trading
203 See Jill Jager, Anticipating Climate Change, ENVIRONMENT, Sep. 1988.
204 See Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61, at 147.
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among refiners and sulphur dioxide trading for acid rain
prevention.
Under this program, nations would be gIven individual
targets and allowed to achieve them by reducing emISSIOns or
purchasing credits from others who could reduce them more
economically. Individual countries could thus achieve their control
obligations through any means chosen and thus accommodate a
variety of separate national implementation strategies. This
program would allow for 'aggregate' pollution reduction at
minimum cost to the society at large. With essentially uniformally-
mixed air pollutants, the concern is on aggregate pollution levels, as
opposed to specific emissions from individual sources. With regard
to the contribution to potential global warming of the different
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is the largest in volume but
accounts for a little less than half of the overall effect, because
carbon dioxide molecules are the least potent of the greenhouse
gases. CFC's, methane, nitrous oxide and ozone are all more potent
per molecule.205 In addition forests, for example, can produce
carbon when they are burnt or chopped, or can absorb it when they
are expanded.
Under this program one can work out an equivalence among
these contributions to global warming and then set for each nation,
by international negotiation, its commitment to meet a performance
goal. Any goals will certainly be a matter of great debate as
developing nations need more latitude and a bigger allowance to
205 See Stewart & Wiener, A Comprehensive Approach to Climate Change. I
AM. ENTERPRISE 70, Nov.-Dec., 1990 pp. 75-80.
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expand. Whatever the allowance, the key advantage of this
approach will be that each country has the flexibility to decide on
the mix of measures it wants to use. Some could concentrate on CFC,
some on carbon dioxide and some on forests.206 For example,
countries like Brazil or Indonesia might find it economically
attractive, as well as environmentally sound to retard deforestation
or to implement forestation programs in order to earn credits
which their own industries could use or which they could sell to
foreign governments. The revenues from sales to these countries
could be used to finance programs of forestation. Countries like the
U.S. could invest in new energy generation facilities in India that
reduce carbon dioxide and would earn a credit against the global
climate change allowance which could be shared between the two
countries. This approach would ensure that reductions would be
achieved at the least total cost and that no nation is unduly
burdened by the costs of emission reduction. It would also provide
a means of transfering resources and technology, particularly to the
developing or the less developed countries, through a competitive
market.
The most difficult problem associated with this program, as
with any other greenhouse-gas control program, will be achieving
agreement on both the global emissions cap and individual national
control obligations. The trading program highlights this problem
because it makes it more explicit. Since the program would create a
new environmental "currency" (e.g. tons of carbon dioxide), every
206 See Marshall, Stewart, Elliott & Hawkins, supra note 61.
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nation will know immediately its reduction responsibilities. A
variety of alternative allocation mechanisms have been suggested,
including allocations based on gross national product (GNP), total
population, land area and emissions.207 Most proposals for
allocating control obligations among nations call for higher rates for
emissions reductions by industrialized countries than by most
developing countries.208 Any convention will have to deal with the
Issue of establishing global and national baselines.
A formidable challenge that this program faces IS the
establishment of effective monitoring and enforcement prOVISIOns
that are essential for the proper working of this program. Even
basic monitoring of compliance will be a formidable challenge.
Perhaps an international agency would be needed to do the job. The
establishment of such an agency and the allocation of control
obligations would be an extremely difficult task before those
negotiating the international framework agreements. Whether
these or other design problems overshadow the potential
advantages offered by an international greenhouse gas permit
trading program will depend in part, on the skill of those
negotiating the international framework agreements.
207 See Grabb, The Greenhouse Effect: Negotiating Targets, London: Royal
Institute of International Affairs, 1989.
208 See, e.g., Flavin, Slowing Global Warming: Worldwatch Paper 91,
Washington D.C. Worldwatch Institute, Oct. 1989.
A market-based approach to pollution control can lead both
consumers and producers to consider the full social costs and
consequences of their decisions, encourage progress in pollution
control technology, save the policy makers from the endless
proceedings on technical issues that overwhelm them, and keep
government attention focussed on important issues, such as how
much pollution control should be achieved. All this is needed if the
United States is to maintain both economic growth and good
environmental quality.
As we enter the last decade of the century, policy makers,
environmentalists, and private industry all seem receptive to a
new, more market-oriented approach to environmental problems.
We see a strong consensus emerging that carefully designed
market-oriented approaches will often be able to achieve greater
environmental protection at lower costs to the society than is
possible with command-and-control regulations on their own.
Although command-and-control policies have attained some degree
of success, they often pit economic and environmental goals against
each other. These goals should supplement each other if either of
them is to be achieved.
Just as command-and-control policies pose a distinctive set of




economic-incentive policies depend on the existence of well-
functioning markets. For example, if the market for tradable
permits is thin or if the transaction costs are high, the outcome may
be less efficient than anticipated. Firms must be able to identify the
right trading partners and the legal constraints on trading should
be minima1.209 Also, it must be accepted that incentive mechanisms
are not appropriate for all problem areas. For example, highly
localized pollution problems that may pose significant dangers to
human health, may more appropriately be dealt with by
conventional command-and-control approaches. Furthermore, it IS
not enough to identify policies that are cost effective. Several other
necessary steps need to be taken for ensuring that priorities are set
more intelligently. For example, the key to EPA's decision to
eliminate lead in gasoline was an economic analysis performed In
EPA's office of Planning and Policy Evaluation showing that the
move would achieve major health benefits at little or no net cost.210
Other factors that must be considered include the equity
effects of the policy, geographical regions, their impacts on the poor
etc. It may be appropriate in some instances to compensate those
who are harmed by the introduction of these policies. For instance,
under a tradable-permit pollution control program, the initial
209 Under the acid rain provlSlons, the broad geographic extent of the
market and the fact that trades can be made on a one to one basis with
relatively few restrictions are designed to promote active trading. The report
of the Senate Committee on Environmental and Public Works on Sl630
concludes that "all indications are that the market for allowances will be
economically competitive and highly robust. See S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. 19 (1989).
210 See, Stewart, Economics, Environment and the Limits of Legal Control, 9
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 8 (1985).
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allocation of emission permits can be designed to favour those
firms that would otherwise suffer the greatest losses. Compared
with a uniform standard approach to pollution control, marketable
permits generate efficiency gains that can help compensate those
who are most harmed by a regulation. Taking all such steps will not
necessarily impose greater burdens on administrators from the
BAT approach that presently prevails.211 Even if they do, the
question is whether increased administrative costs are outweighed
by greater benefits to the society as a whole. The development by
EPA of the bubble and trade-off policies required additional
information gathering, analysis and other efforts. But the payoff
has been enormous with the bubble alone saving over $700
million212 and inspiring new ways of cleaning up pollution.
In short no single approach, whether market-based or command-
and-control can be the ultimate for the diverse environmental and
natural resource problems that we face. The real challenge is to
choose the right policy or combination of policies for each problem.
Numerous opportunities exist, but each must be assessed on a case
by case basis. We must develop a clear understanding of the
211 For example, in the 1972 Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments,
Congress imposed uniform technology-based standards to avoid the
transaction costs and implementation problems involved in policing
environmental quality standards. In order to simplify decision making the
act ignored variations in water quality uses and goals. In implementing the
act however the EPA felt compelled to consider these variations and set
separate standards for over 500 different industries, a majority of which
were challenged in court. Long delays in implementing the statutory scheme
resulted. See also S. Melnick, supra note 43, at 193-205.
212See R. LIROFF, THE BUBBLE POLICY AND EMISSIONS TRADING: THE TOLL AND
TROUBLE OF REGULATORY REFORM (1985).
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problems we face before we begin our search for appropriate tools
of public policy.
In many respects, the real work lies ahead. The design of
effective and practical market-oriented strategies based on the
criteria set out here, will require the active participation of the
diverse environmental community. Regulators, environmental
activists and private industry representatives must take up this
important but difficult challenge of designing effective, efficient,
equitable and truly feasible policies and programs.
Congress has taken the first step with Title IV of the Clean
Air Act Amendments 1990. Although a modest beginning, it starts
down the highly productive path of a market-approach to pollution
control. It may be a model for flexibility in future environmental
regulatory activities. The steps that remain in the design and
implementation, will not only be more important but also more
difficult. The receptive mood towards market solutions at the state,
federal and international levels portends real progress with regard
to the great challenges of environmental pollution.
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